ANSI ANS 57.3-2018 pdf free download – Design Requirements for New Fuel Storage Facilities at Light Water Reactor Plants.
1Introduction and scope1.1Introduction
Storage and handling of new nuclear fuel requires consideration be given to receipt inspection, preventionof theft or criticality, and protection from sabotage or physical damage.
1.2Scope
This standard ” defines the required functions of dry storage facilities for new fuel at light waterreactor nuclear power plants. It provides minimum design requirements for safe storage of newnuclear fuel and control components at such plants. The fuel storage facilities covered by thisstandard are used for receiving, inspecting, and storing fuel containing new and recycled uraniumand mixed oxides. The basis of this standard is to ensure that the design of the facility will beperformed in an efficient and economical manner to (a) preclude criticality; (b) ensure protection ofnew fuel assemblies,control components, plant personnel, and the public; and (c) maintain radiationexposures As Low As Reasonably Achievable(ALARA).Storage of new fuel assemblies in a spentfuel pool is covered in ANS-57.2-1983 (withdrawn) [1].2′
Acronyms and definitions
2.1Acronyms
ALARA: As Low As Reasonably AchievablessCs: structures, systems, and componentsSSE: safe shutdown earthquake
2.2Shall, should, and may
shall, should, and may:The word “shall” is used to denote a requirement; the word “should” is used todenote a recommendation; and the word “may” is used to denote permission, neither a requirement nor arecommendation.
2.3Definitions
cell: A unit for storage of an individual fuel assembly. It is a subassembly of a storage rack.
control components: Components that control coolant flow or reactivity and may be handled or shiftedin position during fuel loading or refueling.Examples are control rods,flow-limiting components， andburnable absorbers.
fuel handling equipment: Equipment used for moving new fuel during receipt and inspection,transporting to storage in-plant, and loading this fuel and control components in the reactor.
latching: Physically attaching a tool to a fuel assembly or control component in such a manner as topreclude accidental release.
mixed-oxide (MOX) fuel: A type of nuclear fuel that contains plutonium oxide mixed with uranium oxide.natural phenomena: Environmental conditions external to a plant that are not manmade, some examplesof which are earthquakes,tornadoes,flooding, lightning, hurricanes,snow, and ice.(Natural phenomenaaccommodated by nuclear power plant design criteria are termed “natural hazards.”‘)
new fuel: A nuclear fuel assembly that has not been used for power generation.
new fuel elevator: Equipment usually installed in the spent fuel pool or fuel transfer canal to allow newfuel, from either a shipping container, a new fuel inspection stand, or the new fuel storage racks， to belowered for handling by the fuel handling equipment.
new fuel storage rack enclosure:The boundary structures of the new fuel storage facility that protect thenew fuel from the environment and from damage, theft, and sabotage.Such an enclosure may consist of avault around the racks, a covered storage room or an open storage pit housed in a building, or an entirebuilding in which the new fuel is being stored.
optimal (optimum) moderation: The moderation condition that yields the highest effective neutronmultiplication factor.
rack: A structure consisting of an assembly of cells.
safe shutdown earthquake (SSE):The earthquake that is based upon an evaluation of the maximumearthquake potential,considering regional and local geology and seismology and specificcharacteristics of local subsurface material. It is the earthquake that produces the maximumvibratory ground motion for which safety-related structures， systems, and components (SSCs) aredesigned to perform their safety-related functions.
safety class: Classification of ssCs based on their nuclear safety function.
3System safety functions
The function of the new fuel storage facility is to store and protect new fuel with or without controlcomponents at a plant.The safety functions of this facility are described in Sec.3.1.
3.1 Functional requirements
(1) Prevent criticality.This is accomplished by SsC design, configuration, and operational controls.
(2) Prevent fuel damage. This is accomplished by ssC design,configuration，and operational controls.
(3) Prevent theft or sabotage. This is accomplished by facility design and security controls.ANSI ANS 57.3 pdf download.